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Maria Mäkelä
Possible minds
Constructing – and reading – another consciousness 
as fiction
Abstract
The “old school” and the “new school” of narratology seem to share a referential 
bias in their view of fictional minds. (1) Classical studies assume that via a metic-
ulous differentiation of voices and viewpoints, we are able to extract a “reliable” 
representation of the fictional world. (2) Recent cognitive approaches tend to 
regard fictional and actual minds as being based on precisely the same cognitive 
schemata; we should ask ourselves, however, whether the natural parameters of 
thought and those of fiction actually converge. In this paper, I wish to demon-
strate the challenge that fictional characters representing each other’s perceptions, 
thoughts and feelings issue to both classical and cognitive approaches to fiction-
al minds. I suggest that fictional agents – not only narrators but focalizers as 
well – may take advantage of precisely the same techniques of constructing the 
minds of others as are used in omniscient narration. Furthermore, I try to dem-
onstrate how this feature of literary representation inherently problematizes the 
“naturalizing” of (fictional) mental functioning. I will start with examples from 
homodiegetic narration (Ford Madox Ford, Richard Ford) and then widen the 
scope to more problematic instances in the heterodiegetic mode (Emmanuèle 
Bernheim, Fay Weldon). I argue that the “narrative tendency” of a character con-
structing other characters’ minds potentially mitigates the binarity of homodi-
egetic and heterodiegetic narration. Finally, such speculating and narrativizing 
– and perhaps fantasizing, hallucinating – fictional minds provide a parallel, not 
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with “normal” human consciousness relying on the parameters of everyday ex-
perience, but with specifically literary construction. Furthermore, such (doubly) 
embedded consciousness representation reveals the reader’s effort to construct 
fictional mental functioning as inherently “unnatural” – since there is no such 
thing as true mimesis of the mind.
1 Introduction
Lately, we have been witnessing a change in the narratological frame of mind. 
Narrative theory has travelled far from the classical assumption of the story 
having a mind or a sense of its own; instead, in the wake of the cognitive turn, 
we are eager to pay attention to the role of the reading mind in narrative sense 
making. Yet these “old school” and “new school” approaches both seem to share 
a referential bias in their view of fictional minds.
1) The classical studies concentrating on the differentiation of (inner) 
voices and viewpoints of individual subjectivities seem to adhere to the 
same mimetic illusion that is inscribed in realistic fiction – an illusion 
which is, however, already abandoned or abused by modernist narra-
tive techniques. This ideal of referentiality, of having access to the “reli-
able” representation of the fictional world (“textual actual world;” cf. 
Ryan 1991: 112–113) goes hand in hand with locating the ultimate rep-
resentative authority in the omniscient, objective narrative voice. Con-
sequently, studies on free indirect discourse and focalization tend to fo-
cus (both methodologically and thematically) on drawing boundaries 
between the narrator’s indirect reports of the fictional world and the 
“subjective” and thus “unreliable” material which is filtered through 
fictional consciousnesses, (preferably) bearing the linguistic markers of 
direct or free indirect representation. What is ignored by this kind of 
approach (labeled as the “speech category approach” by Alan Palmer 
2004: 1) is the fact that, subjective perception and inner worlds being 
its main themes, the modernist consciousness novel is not so much a 
representation of a particular kind of fictional storyworld as it is a spec-
trum of the characters’ own mental representations of the fictional real-
ity (cf., Herman 2002: 36–46). Thus the interpretive task is not to seek 
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the truth about the fictional world but to reflect on the ways in which 
the partial, local and subjective truths are constructed.
2) The main task of cognitive narratology, the description and analysis of 
the cognitive mechanisms behind our reading and understanding of 
narratives (a perfectly profitable project as such), has led to a tendency 
to consider fictional and actual human minds as being based on the 
same cognitive schemata (cf. Margolin 2003; Palmer 2004). We should 
ask ourselves, however, whether the natural parameters of thought and 
those of fiction actually converge. Furthermore, the availability of in-
formation about minds in fiction and about actual minds differ sig-
nificantly: when reading fictional minds we are often privileged with 
omniscience as far as the thoughts and feelings of the main character(s) 
are concerned, but may or may not be forced to perceive the fictional 
world and other characters through the limitations brought on by these 
“transparent minds.” Consequently, what we have is a set of possible 
worlds and possible minds that we cannot falsify (at least not without 
careful interpretation) – unlike in the real world, where we usually 
know a schizophrenic when we see one.
In this paper, I wish to avoid such referential biases and concentrate on the 
peculiarly novelistic ways of thematizing human consciousness. Methodologi-
cally, however, I try to draw on both the classical formalist approaches and the 
cognitive-based innovations whenever they seem to be sensitive enough to the 
literary phenomena in question. My particular aim is to highlight the functions 
of free indirect discourse (and related techniques of rendering fictional mental 
activity) in embedded or recursive representation of consciousness. The problem 
will be illustrated with four exemplary texts: novels by Ford Madox Ford (The 
Good Soldier, 1915) and Emmanuèle Bernheim (Sa femme/Sa Femme, Or the 
Other Woman, 1993/1994) and short stories by Richard Ford (‘Privacy,’ 2001) 
and Fay Weldon (‘Weekend,’ 1978).
In the field of cognitive science, it was Daniel Dennett who first, in 1983, dis-
cussed the levels of intentionality as a cognitive model: mental “worlds” can be 
represented as a recursive system that is potentially infinite as in statements like 
“X thinks that Y believes A to be mad at B” and so on (see, eg. Zunshine 2003: 
278). Such embedded states of mind occur frequently in novels concentrating on 
the psychological processes of the characters – however, it is the peculiar nature 
234
 
Maria Mäkelä
of novelistic presentation that it often avoids such overt marks of intentional-
ity as explicit mentions of who is behind each represented thought, opinion, or 
discourse. This ambiguity of voices/subjectivities has been a perennial topic in 
classical narratology, but, as indicated above, the main cause for the concern has 
been the ambiguity between objective narratorial report and the subjective ele-
ments attributable to a fictional character (e.g. Pascal 1977). A far less scoured 
area of novelistic consciousness representation has to do with characters repre-
senting each other’s perceptions, thoughts and feelings; a glance at the brand new 
Routledge Encyclopedia of narrative theory attests to the absence of research on 
this particular area (see, eg. the entry on THOUGHT AND CONSCIOUSNESS 
REPRESENTATION by Palmer in Herman & Jahn & Ryan (ed.) 2005: 602–
607). What I would like to suggest in this paper is that fictional agents – not only 
narrators but focalizers as well – may take advantage of precisely the same tech-
niques of constructing the minds of others as are used in omniscient narration. 
Furthermore, I try to demonstrate how this feature of literary representation 
inherently problematizes the “naturalizing” of (fictional) mental functioning.
Obviously, the potential of embedded consciousness representation has not 
passed without any notice among narratologists. Moshe Ron provides examples 
from The Good Soldier (Ron 1981: 23–24) as well as from Henry Miller’s Sexus 
(ibid.: 31), pointing out the narrative possibilities of “focalizers focalizing each 
other” and the challenge this kind of representation issues to the “Mimetic Lan-
guage Game.” Brian McHale (1983: 33–34) also singles out this kind of represen-
tation in Ulysses (is Bloom constructing Gerty MacDowell’s point of view within 
his own or does the narration offer a “real” shift to Gerty’s mind?) to prove that, 
unlike Banfield argues, we definitely need contextual cues – in addition to lin-
guistic ones – in order to attribute represented thought segments to individual 
characters. Yet, even the cognitively inclined theorists who (briefly) touch upon 
cases of embedded consciousness representation (Jahn 1992: 357–358; Zunshine 
2003: 278–281) consider its thematic implications only in relation to the assumed 
“what is really going on in this passage” instead of paying attention to the chal-
lenge such representation issues to referentiality, experientiality (cf. Fludernik 
1996) – and to cognitive narratology, for that matter.
In the following, I try to demonstrate how fictional mental worlds embed-
ded within each other challenge both classical and cognitive approaches to 
fictional minds. I will start with examples from homodiegetic narration (Ford 
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Madox Ford and Richard Ford) and then widen the scope to more problematic 
instances in the heterodiegetic mode (Bernheim, Weldon); finally, I argue that 
embedded consciousness representation potentially mitigates the binarity of 
first-person (homodiegetic) and third-person (heterodiegetic) narration (a nar-
ratological idée reçue). The “narrative tendency” of a character constructing the 
other characters’ minds conflicts both 1) with the (natural narratology) logic 
that epistemic restrictions result in narrative restrictions as well; and 2) with the 
idea that in a heterodiegetic narrative situation, all diegetic material should be 
attributed to the narrator while the role of the character is restricted to “reveal-
ing” him/herself through the mimetic glimpses the narration offers to the read-
er. Furthermore, novels with such speculating and narrativizing – and perhaps 
fantasizing, hallucinating – characters are also self-reflective in that they reflect 
both the novelist’s and the reader’s process of interpretation and construction of 
fictional worlds and consciousnesses. The analogy between embedded mental 
spaces and fictional world construction will also lead us – at least for a while 
– to the cognitive linguistic realms of Possible Worlds Theory and Text World 
Theory (cf. Ryan 1991; Doležel 1998; Gavins 2003).
Instead of pledging allegiance to the linguistic or otherwise strict definitions 
of free indirect discourse, I attempt to use this classical concept as representing 
the narrative “border phenomena,” not just between indirect and direct repre-
sentation, but between the mental spaces (possible worlds and possible minds) 
evoked in narration. Consequently, the “freedom” of these narrative situations 
refers to the implicitness of the levels of intentionality and the “indirectness” 
to all the mediating agents that separate the reader from the referred subject of 
representation – the last mental domain at the end of the narrative food chain.
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2 Character as narrator: The “I” who was not there
One of the most recent and convincing voices in the field of narratology belongs 
to Alan Palmer (2004; see also 2002) who, besides drawing our attention afresh1 
to the problematic of consciousness representation, questions the validity of the 
speech category approach for illuminating the ways fictional minds can be nar-
rated. Palmer wishes to shift our attention from mere “thoughtful characters in 
self-communion” (cf. Cohn 1978: v) – and consequently, from the highly verbal-
ized component of “fictional mental functioning” – to the whole “social mind 
in action” (Palmer 2004: 9–12). One direction for Palmer as for many others 
is towards a cognitive-based analysis of stories where the apparatus of classi-
cal narratology is complemented and partly replaced by, as Palmer (2004: 14) 
labels them, “real-mind discourses.” According to Palmer, the classical speech 
category approach has neglected the “natural” component in the reader’s proc-
ess of constructing fictional minds:
[j]ust as in real life the individual constructs the minds of others from 
their behavior and speech, so the reader infers the workings of fictional 
minds and sees these minds in action from observation of characters’ 
behavior and speech. (Palmer 2004: 11)
However, what we are dealing with in reading narrative fiction and fictional 
minds is, after all, language, and the problem of putting our own and other 
people’s minds in words. One way of approaching this paradox of fiction – the 
necessity of constructing other minds, yet being dependent on language as the 
1 One might argue that nothing much has happened on this front since Cohn’s path-
breaking Transparent Minds (1978) and McHale’s (1983) elegant slating of Banfield’s 
linguistic-based approach to FID. (See, however, Lehtimäki & Tammi, forthcoming.) 
Both Cohn and McHale deserve credit for establishing the currently accepted view 
of FID, not as a mere linguistic category, but as a literary figure dependent on con-
textual and extra-linguistic markers. Furthermore, alongside with Stanzel (1984), 
they have demonstrated the fluidity of narrative situations along the scale between 
the authorial and the figural narrative situations and, more specifically, drawn our 
attention to the ambiguous and fuzzy border areas where the actual narrative situa-
tions are often situated. 
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only semiotic channel – is to look into it as it is thematized in narrative fiction 
itself.
Although Palmer is definitely right about our “natural” ways of making ac-
quaintance with fictional characters resembling real people, it is precisely the 
seemingly natural relationships between fictional characters existing on the 
same diegetic level that may complicate such reading strategy. The history of 
narrative fiction teems with obsessive, paranoid or overly sentimental protago-
nists who misrepresent other characters through false speculation. Many of the 
paradigmatic cases have been discussed under the notion of “unreliable narra-
tion” – which is of little use here since unreliability defines the whole business 
of embedding fictional minds within each other. Furthermore, as Greta Olson 
(2003) has recently pointed out, unreliability is a characteristic far too easily 
attributed to all kinds of narrators who are also protagonists in their own nar-
rative: “Homodiegetic narrators are subject to the epistemological uncertainty 
of lived experience. Yet they are not necessarily unreliable.” (Olson 2003: 101.) 
Condemning a narrator for unreliability requires a firm belief in the epistemo-
logical vraisemblance of the given narrative, which actually seems a paradoxical 
prerequisite to start with. On the other hand, we find examples from narrative 
fiction that deconstruct such epistemic limitations – and, consequently, upend 
the conventional binarity of “restricted” homodiegetic and omniscient hetero-
diegetic narration.
In Ford Madox Ford’s novel The Good Soldier, the narrator-protagonist John 
Dowell tries to give an exhaustive account of “the saddest story [he has] ever 
heard” (The Good Soldier: 7). Yet we are uncertain whether this saddest story is 
a triangle drama between Dowell himself, his wife Florence and Edward Ash-
burnham; or between Edward, Florence and Edward’s wife Leonora; or between 
Edward, Leonora and the last one of Edward’s mistresses, their young protégée 
Nancy. The confusion is due to Dowell’s narrative techniques which constantly 
seem to shift the focus from Dowell’s own experiential domain to that of others. 
He keeps reminding us that his narration consists of a faithful recounting of ac-
tions and other people’s personal experiences as they have been related to him 
by Leonora and Edward. Nevertheless, it seems typical of Dowell’s narration 
to drop off the parentheticals (such as “I remember Leonora told she felt” etc.) 
that would reveal the double-recounting that frames the individual experience, 
especially when he moves on to depict passionate feelings.
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(1) For she [Leonora] discovered that Edward Ashburnham was paying a 
blackmailer of whom she had never heard something like three hun-
dred pounds a year… It was a devil of a blow; it was like death; for 
she imagined that by that time she had really got to the bottom of her 
husband’s liabilities. (The Good Soldier: 65; emphasis added)
(2) So, you see, he [Edward] would have plenty to gurgle about to a woman 
[…] with his intense, optimistic belief that the woman he was making 
love to at the moment was the one he was destined, at last, to be eter-
nally constant to… (The Good Soldier: 34; emphasis added)
(3) His marriage with Leonora had been arranged by his parents, and 
though he always admired her immensely, he had hardly ever pretend-
ed to be much more than tender to her, though he desperately needed 
her moral support, too… (The Good Soldier: 67; emphasis added)
The emphasized segments in the examples above seem to slide towards free in-
direct discourse. This is not the Proustian case of FID in homodiegetic narra-
tion – displaying the dual experience of both the narrating and the experienc-
ing “I” (cf. Helkkula’s article in this volume) – but comes, instead, close to the 
heteroglossic doubling of voices, conventionally ascribed to the heterodiegetic 
narrative situation2. We could, of course, naturalize Dowell’s use of emotionally 
consonant narration (yet narration with a bitterly ironic undercurrent showing 
through) within the linguistic framework of free indirect speech. This would, 
however, be a solution only in individual cases, not with regard to the whole 
narrative situation and its thematic significance. The opaqueness that Dowell’s 
narration produces between the reader and the assumed fictional reality and 
its inhabitants is dramatized in those moments when we cannot tell a true re-
counting of another person’s words (possibly in example 1) from Dowell’s own 
generalizations of someone else’s frame of mind (possibly in example 3) or even 
from his own hypotheses and judgments (possibly in example 2).
Dowell’s case gets further complicated by passages constructing “third-de-
gree” experientiality, as in the lengthy description of Nancy’s emotional tumult 
2  Yet also Genette (1980: 207–208) points out several passages in Recherche that show 
“Proust capable of transgressing the limits of his own narrative ‘system’” and adher-
ing to “the omniscience of the classical novelist”.
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at the moment Edward’s love dawns on her: the representation of Nancy’s con-
sciousness cannot be based on her own verbal rendering of her experiences but 
must be derived from Leonora’s, or, more probably, from Dowell’s hypotheses 
(who was not there to witness any of this). When Dowell describes Nancy’s 
childishly hysterical state, he uses the whole scale of speech categories just as 
omniscient narration would, from (4) indirect to (5) free indirect and (6) direct 
discourse.
(4) She began thinking about love (…) She had a vague recollection that love 
was said to render a hopeless lover’s eyes hopeless (…) she remembered 
that lovers’ existences were said to be punctuated with heavy sighs. (…) 
she felt like a person who is burning up with an inward flame, dessicat-
ing at the soul with thirst (…) (The Good Soldier: 256–258)
(5) Unhappiness; unhappiness; unhappiness was all around her. (…) It 
must then be right that she should go. Edward was always right in his 
determinations. (…) Well, she was prepared to tell him that she was 
ready to witness his amours with another young girl. She would stay 
there – to comfort Leonora. (…) Leonora, Leonora with her hunger, 
with her cruelty, had driven Edward to madness. He must be sheltered 
by his love for her (…) (ibid.: 258–263)
(6) It seemed to her that for one short moment her spirit could say: “Dom-
ine, nunc dimittis… Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace.” 
(ibid.: 261)
The examples demonstrate how the speech categories are not in any natural way 
congruent with actual speech or thought acts and, consequently, cannot be de-
fined as direct or indirect in terms of referentiality. However, already the firmly 
established list of “syntactical markers” reveals the fact that the narratological 
doxa concerning free indirect discourse is deeply rooted in the speech category 
approach: we speak of “back-shift of tenses,” “retention of deixis” and “conver-
sion of personal pronouns,” thus privileging the mimetic utterance, the enoncé 
– as if the process of narration was somehow supplementary. This is what Moni-
ka Fludernik (1993: 281–282) calls “the direct discourse fallacy” in speech and 
thought representation; and it is precisely texts like The Good Soldier and overly 
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narrativizing characters like John Dowell that highlight the ultimate nature of 
consciousness representation as – should we say – “the direct access fallacy.”
Here, Fludernik’s theory of schematic language representation (1993) comes 
in useful; namely – and this is, I am aware, a simplifying account of Fludernik’s 
theory – the view that whatever the mode used in representing someone else’s 
discourse, we are always dealing with approximations, not verbatim reproduc-
tions. Human cognition operates with prototypical expectations, and in the 
case of discourse reproduction, it means that both telling and reading adhere 
to typical schemas of language use. (Fludernik 1993: 398–408, passim.) Dowell’s 
apparent reproduction of Nancy’s thoughts and emotions is a case of language 
schematization and typification par excellence: he claims to “know that she pic-
tured herself as some personage with a depressed, earnest face and tightly closed 
lips” (The Good Soldier: 259), but the reader, already aware of Dowell’s biased re-
lationship to his own story, can tell that it is precisely Dowell himself who relies 
heavily on the literary-cultural schemas of sentimental desire. This strategy can 
be seen as culminating in the pathetic prayer (example 6) Dowell claims Nancy’s 
“spirit could say;” as Fludernik’s theory has it, also direct discourse representa-
tion relies on prototypical (habitual, recurrent, predictable) speech acts, not the 
“original” utterance (see Fludernik 1993: 409–414). Consequently, Nancy and, 
more or less, also Edward, Leonora and Florence, end up but as characters with-
in Dowell’s own fiction. As Paul B. Armstrong notes in his study on the “Ford-
ian Bewilderment,” “Dowell only discovers what he thinks and what his history 
means by offering his experience to himself in language” (Armstrong 1987: 196). 
The Good Soldier is ultimately not, however, the narrator-protagonist’s account 
of his individualized experiences but a mixture of undifferentiated passions, 
mostly projected to other subjectivities than Dowell’s own.
In Genettean terminology, Dowell’s narration suffers from paralepsis: he ex-
ceeds the epistemic limitations that the logic of narrative sets to him. However, 
the question is not about simply knowing too much but of entering another ex-
periential plane; in terms of Fludernik’s “Natural Narratology,” we cannot nar-
rativize such descriptions within the cognitive frame of mere telling but must 
adhere to the frame of experiencing (cf. Fludernik 1996: 43–50). As Fludernik 
points out, “(…) reflectoral narration, for example in its reliance on the figural 
psyche as the evoked transmissive medium of the story, structures narration 
around the script of experiencing or viewing, rather than telling events” (Flud-
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ernik 1993, 449). Yet narrative situations like the one described above contrast 
with Fludernik’s initial point – which is to consider real life experientiality and 
the kind provided by narratives as analogous. For, what Dowell’s narration of-
fers us is fake experientiality, or projected experientiality. Free indirect discourse 
plays a major part in this process of projection since, by definition, it is a mode of 
thought representation that avoids parentheticals and thus obscures the source 
of (mental) discourse. The distancing function of FID is further enhanced by 
Dowell’s recurrent use of literary and artistic frames in constructing the past 
experiences; as Miriam Bailin demonstrates in her analysis of The Good Soldier, 
Dowell uses the aesthetic form “to control and shape the raw material of experi-
ence and neutralize threatening emotions” (1987: 74). FID, in all its freedom, 
allows Dowell to take part in the drama he was left out of by the time of action 
(“Unhappiness; unhappiness; unhappiness”) and somehow release his own sup-
pressed desires by, especially, projecting them into his wife’s lover (see example 
2; cf. also Armstrong 1987: 219–220). He transcends the fatal unawareness of his 
wife’s infidelities, but only to end up in deceptive paralepsis – in “knowing too 
much,” both in terms of epistemic limitations and of his own emotional capac-
ity.
Uri Margolin presents the cognitive task that narrative fiction imposes on 
the reader as follows:
(…) we are operating within the confines of a make-believe world, pre-
tending that narrators and storyworld participants exist independently 
of the text which actually creates them via semiotic means, and that 
they are sufficiently human-like so that concepts developed in cognitive 
science to model the activities of actual human minds are applicable to 
them, even if only through analogical transfer. (Margolin 2003: 273)
The nature of the fictional universe as a hypothesis, as “make-believe,” is much 
the same as the nature of the other consciousness. In Possible Worlds Theory 
and in Text World Theory, the whole system of “make-believe” worlds comes 
in neat Chinese boxes: the first order hypothetical domain forms the “textual 
actual world;” in the subjective perceptions of fictional characters, this world is 
(re)shaped into second-order mental representations; and by using their capac-
ity to create non-existent, possible worlds, these fictional minds produce their 
own fictions, that is, fictions within fiction (cf. Ryan 1991: 22; Gavins 2003: 
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130–132). Yet one problem remains: narrative fiction does not readily appear in 
3D-modelled patterns, although, since the regime of cognitive narratology, one 
may be tempted to think it does.
The example of John Dowell demonstrates how we operate with the hypo-
thetical when constructing other people’s thoughts and emotions. There is thus 
nothing unnatural in speculating about other people’s mental activities – the 
unnatural takes over as these hypotheses are verbalized and woven into the 
thread of fictional representation. If we were to approach the problem from the 
angle of linguistics, we would adhere to modal logic, the grammatical means to 
construct the hypothetical such as counterfactuals or the conditional (and this 
is what Possible Worlds Theory and Text World Theory tend to do). Genette 
pays attention to this linguistic loophole available to epistemologically restrict-
ed homodiegetic narrators: “Since Spitzer, critics have often noted the frequency 
of those modalizing locutions (perhaps, undoubtedly, as if, seem, appear) that al-
low the narrator to say hypothetically what he could not assert without stepping 
outside internal focalization” (Genette 1980: 203). However, precisely due to the 
analogy between fictional world construction and the construction of mental 
spaces, it is often impossible to separate the modal from the actual. If we once 
again return to the narration of The Good Soldier, we may see that Dowell shares 
the epistemic uncertainty with his reader.
(7) I seemed to perceive the swift questions chasing each other through the 
brain that was behind them. I seemed to hear the brain ask and the eyes 
answer with all the simpleness of a woman who (…) (The Good Soldier: 
40; emphases added)
(8) I seem to see three figures, two of them clasped close in an intense em-
brace, and one intolerably solitary. It is in black and white, my picture 
of that judgment, an etching, perhaps, (…) (ibid.: 82; emphasis added)
In some of the rare cases Dowell refers to his own mental representations (ex-
ample 8), he renders them with at least same amount of uncertainty as the ones 
he projects into other people’s minds (example 7). Example (8) highlights his 
tendency to escape into aesthetics – into fiction – rather than sort out his true 
feelings. As Armstrong puts it, Dowell’s “surprise and confusion reveal that his 
“reality” was an interpretive construct, a composition based on hypotheses and 
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presuppositions” (1987: 201) – and if we examine Dowell’s strategies for compos-
ing the inner realities of other characters, we can be rather convinced that for 
him the reality never ceases to be “an interpretive construct.”
One of the points of modernist fiction is to demonstrate how we are always 
bound to be left out from the “textual actual world.” Sometimes the theme of 
alienation can be taken further when a character is represented as distancing 
himself or being distanced from his own consciousness. As already pointed out 
in the case of the self-denying John Dowell, it is often the construction of one’s 
own experience that seems to call for modality. Richard Ford’s short story ‘Pri-
vacy’ provides a striking example of the distancing between the narrating and 
the experiencing “I.” The story begins with a man’s recounting of his habitual 
married life; soon the iterative narration breaks off and turns into an intense 
singulative representation of the man’s nocturnal experience as he watches a 
woman undress on an opposing window.
(9) I don’t know all that I thought. Undoubtedly I was aroused. Undoubt-
edly I was thrilled by the secrecy of watching out of the dark. Undoubt-
edly I loved the very illicitness of it, of my wife sleeping nearby and 
knowing nothing of what I was doing. It is also possible I even liked the 
cold as it surrounded me, as complete as the night itself, may even have 
felt that the sight of the woman – whom I took to be young and lacking 
caution or discretion – held me somehow, insulated me and made the 
world stop and be perfectly expressible as two poles connected by my 
line of vision. I am sure now that all of this had to do with my impend-
ing failures. (‘Privacy:’ 5; emphases added)
The passage is paradoxical through and through since it both constructs and de-
constructs the protagonist’s experiential frame. The suspiciously vivid descrip-
tion of the intense coldness and secrecy of the moment questions the narrator’s 
insistence on not being sure about his past sensations. When the man, later on, 
accidentally encounters the woman he has (by now repeatedly) been peeping at, 
he finds out she is surprisingly old and suspects that the woman finds his atten-
tion somehow menacing.
(10) I might suddenly have felt the urge to harm her, and easily could’ve. But 
of course that was not my thought. (…) I didn’t want her to think my 
mind contained what it did and also what it did not. (ibid.: 7)
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The former modality turns, at the end of the story, into a complete negation: 
instead of representing his former thoughts, the narrator reports what he did 
not think. One possible interpretation is that the narrator-protagonist projects 
his own violent and abusive obsessions into the woman’s unnecessary fear. The 
sentence “I might suddenly have felt the urge to harm her, and easily could’ve” is 
not, by the linguistic definition, exactly free indirect discourse but still it creates 
an ambivalent dual perspective; the sentence is, in a way, left lingering between 
the two characters, as a hypothesis not exactly originating from either of their 
consciousnesses3.
Alienating oneself from one’s own mind and projecting emotions and ex-
periences into another are, as it seems, cognitive strategies that may exceed the 
logic of language. Next, we will move on to discuss embedded consciousness 
representation in heterodiegetic narrative situations to see if the third person 
reference will open up further possible minds.
3 Character as focalizer: Encounters with the third
When reading Emmanuèle Bernheim’s novel Sa femme (translated into English 
as Sa Femme, Or the Other Woman), the reader is first captivated by the frame 
of the conventional “adultery story“ – and so is the protagonist, Claire: the nar-
ration concentrates on Claire’s mind as it becomes more and more preoccupied 
with the secret encounters with her lover and, moreover, with images of his wife 
and children. In the course of the narrative, however, Claire’s mental activity 
turns out to be based on obsession and fantasy. As her obsession grows worse 
her fantasies about the man’s wife begin to dominate the narration as well.
(11) Does his wife sometimes make him up a lunchbox? In the morning she 
fills it up with yesterday’s leftovers and seals it. She smiles. It reminds 
her of the early days of their marriage, when Thomas was still a fore-
3 Yet one more ambiguity arises and enables us to construct a “triple perspective:” 
does the sentence reproduce the past sensation of the experiencing I in free indirect 
discourse or does the possibility of violence cross the narrator-protagonist’s mind 
only at the moment of recounting? 
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man. The children look on enviously – they’d like a lunch-box to take 
to school. They’d make a wood fire to heat it up, and they wouldn’t 
have to go to the dining hall. (Sa Femme, Or the Other Woman: 49; 
emphases added)
 Sa femme lui prépare-t-elle parfois une gamelle? Le matin, elle la rem-
plit avec le reste du plat de la veille et elle la ferme hermétiquement. Elle 
sourit. Cela lui rappelle les premiers temps de leur mariage, quand 
Thomas était encore chef de chantier. Les enfants regardent avec en-
vie. Ils aimeraient bien, eux aussi, une gamelle qu’ils emporteraient à 
l’école. Ils feraient un feu de bois pour la réchauffer. Et ils n’iraient pas 
à la cantine. (Sa femme: 51–52; emphases added)
The point at which Claire’s own mental representations deviate most from the 
assumed actual states of the story-world is when Thomas reveals that he has no 
wife and no children after all, and even after this revelation Claire keeps to her 
own position as “another woman” and has a hard time letting go of her carefully 
constructed images of the man’s domestic happiness. Finally, it seems that for 
Claire, the only way to adjust is to transfer the obsession to one of her patients, 
Monsieur Corey and to sa femme – and to fill her mind with images of their 
everyday life.
(12) She thought about M. Corey. With a fever like that, his body would heat 
up the bed so much in the night that his wife would probably throw the 
big eiderdown aside. (Sa Femme, Or the Other Woman: 104; emphasis 
added)
 Elle pensa à Monsieur Corey. Avec la fièvre, son corps chaufferait telle-
ment le lit qu’au cours de la nuit, sa femme rejetterait sans doute le gros 
édredon. (Sa femme: 102; emphasis added)
(13) M. Corey would still be very tired, and it would, in all probability, take 
him ten minutes. Now, he’s putting on his fur-lined jacket, knotting his 
scarf and leaving his flat. He gets into the lift. His wife stops him, she 
hands him his gloves. He thanks her and kisses her. What would he do 
without her? (Sa Femme, Or the Other Woman: 116; emphasis added)
 Monsieur Corey devait être encore très fatigué, il prévoirait sûrement 
dix minutes de trajet. Là, il met sa canadienne, noue son écharpe et sort 
de son appartement. Il entre dans l’ascenceur. Sa femme le rattrape, elle 
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lui tend ses gants. Il la remercie et l’embrasse. Que deviendrait-il sans 
elle? (Sa femme: 112; emphasis added)
The examples above are a bit misleading since the third person reference to 
Claire shows only at the beginning of example (12); yet the whole narrative situ-
ation is framed by the heterodiegetic mode. As the examples demonstrate, how-
ever, Claire is a focalizer in the very sense of the word: what we can infer from 
the narration is hardly anything but “an individual perspectival projection of 
part of a shared phenomenal world” (cf. Margolin 2003: 282). It is almost impos-
sible – or at least contrived – to try to distinguish from the narration “any indi-
viduated cognitive mental functioning” (cf. Margolin 2003: 278) that would be 
attributable to a narrative personage other than Claire; there are no markers of 
privileged, heterodiegetic-extradiegetic knowledge or commentary that would 
establish a narrative level above Claire’s “cognitive mental functioning.” The 
case is further complicated by the fact that, embedded in Claire’s focalization, 
we actually have a kind of second-order system of third-person reference (in ex-
ample 11, to Thomas’s non-existent wife and children; and in example 12, to M. 
and Mme Corey) – and, moreover, a kind of second-order system of focalization 
and representation of consciousness.
How does Claire’s habit of constructing possible worlds (an idyllic morning 
in his lover’s family, M. Corey leaving his apartment for a medical examina-
tion chez Claire) differ from John Dowell’s tendency to “narrate too much?” In 
(Fludernik’s) terms of naturalizing and narrativizing, in Claire’s case, we cannot 
adhere to the frame of telling – at least not as “naturally” as when reading Dow-
ell’s account; as already mentioned above, in Fludernik’s model, focalization is 
evoked by the cognitive frames of experiencing and viewing. Consequently, in a 
heterodiegetic narrative situation, we must frame the representation(s) of men-
tal spaces with yet another Chinese box. In examples (12) and (13), we are led to 
Claire’s internal focalization through a passage of FID (indicated by the modal-
ity of devait être, chaufferait, rejetterait, prévorait); in example (11), focalization 
is evoked by a hypothesis in direct discourse (“Does his wife sometimes make 
him up a lunchbox?”). After this opening up of a story-internal possible world, 
we are led to yet others, to the mental worlds of the characters inhabiting this 
possible world. In examples (11) and (13), Claire goes even so far in her mental 
representations as to project verbalized thought acts into the minds of Thomas’s 
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children (“They’d make a wood fire to heat it up, and they wouldn’t have to 
go to the dining hall”) and M. Corey (“What would he do without her?”). A 
character processing another character’s mental activity into free indirect dis-
course is something we encountered already in homodiegetic narration; in the 
heterodiegetic mode, this may result in double or embedded FID: in example 
(13), Monsieur Corey’s mentally constructed hypothesis (“What would he do 
without her?”) is nested in Claire’s mentally constructed hypothesis (“M. Corey 
would still be very tired, and it would, in all probability, take him ten minutes”). 
Consequently, what we have is the narration’s representation of a mental repre-
sentation of a mental representation – in other words, a projection of a projec-
tion of a projection. Ron comments on this kind of
[p]assages which force MR [Mimetic Reader] to construe utterances as 
FID embedded or framed within a higher instance of FID. Here the lim-
its of the mimetic powers of language coincide with what can be plausibly 
rescued from an infinite regress where none of the stations is explicitly 
noted. (Ron 1981: 35)
If human cognition is able to understand and organize the levels of intentional-
ity – at least to a point – then why does embedded consciousness representation 
issue a threat to the “Mimetic Language Game?” We already encountered the 
“limits of the mimetic powers of language” when analyzing Dowell’s tendency 
to drop off parentheticals and represent the multiply recounted or completely 
imagined versions of other people’s experiences as a straightforward render-
ing of their mental activity. In cases of embedded FID, we are twice as exposed 
to the same confusions concerning the boundaries between the actual and the 
hypothetical.
The much discussed ambiguity of FID is partly caused by its similarity with 
“pure” objective narration since it usually lacks the linguistic signs of quotation 
or embedding; as a narrative technique, it thus creates loopholes for the focal-
izers to convey their own perspective as if it were an objective report on the ac-
tual state of the storyworld (cf. Mäkelä 2003: 64–66). In the recurrent narrative 
situations of Sa femme, Claire’s fantasies begin with the indirect report of the 
narrator sliding towards FID with Claire guessing what the object of her obses-
sion is peut être, sûrement or sans doute doing. The tense may remain imparfait 
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or it may just as well shift into present, and the hypothesis that has started in 
the conditional shifts to the indicative form. From these shifts it follows that 
the subjective fantasy somehow takes over and gains representational author-
ity: the present tense gives a strong illusion of the character’s visions as actually 
perceived. The following example shows how Claire wants her boyfriend to be 
suspicious and imagines him perceiving some traces of another man.
(14) She went into the bathroom, leaving the door half-open, and listened. 
(…) He discovers the fruit juices. That surprises him, because Claire 
never drinks them. Now he sees the bottle of champagne. But Claire 
doesn’t like it – someone must have brought it for her. The fridge door 
closes again. (…) He has understood. (Sa Femme, Or the Other Woman: 
36–37)
 Elle se rendit dans la salle de bains, laissa la porte entrouverte. Et écouta. 
(…) Il découvre les jus de fruits. Cela l’étonne car Claire n’en boit ja-
mais. Maintenant, il voit la bouteille de champagne. Pourtant Claire 
n’aime pas ça. On la lui a sans doute apportée. La porte du frigidaire se 
referme. (…) Il a compris. (Sa femme: 40–41)
It is through minor hints in narration that we recognize a kind of transition 
from the actual events to Claire’s mind and again back to the reality. The only 
change in the narrative mode is from passé simple to present; otherwise Michel’s 
visit to the kitchen is represented as if actually perceived by, not Claire because 
she is in the bathroom, but an omniscient narrator who, furthermore, is able to 
penetrate into Michel’s mind and report his thoughts in FID (“Pourtant Claire 
n’aime pas ça. On la lui a sans doute apportée”). When the narration returns to 
the actual situation with the narrator reporting that “Claire emerged from the 
bathroom” and “Michel didn’t ask her any questions” we don’t get any informa-
tion that would actually prove us that Michel “has understood“ anything. Ulti-
mately, in the context of the whole novel, we are able to conclude that Claire is a 
kind of a narrator in her own right and extends her discursive power all the way 
to other people’s inner worlds.4
4 I am indebted to my shrewd commentator Dr. Mikko Keskinen for his clairvoyance 
in suggesting to me the connection – which, for me, now seems obvious – between 
the character’s name “Claire” and her ostensible ability to construct parallel univers-
es: Claire who sees, Claire voyant, is deceivingly clairvoyant. If we should continue 
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The difference between Dowell’s and Claire’s strategies of projection is that, 
whereas Dowell operates within the frame of telling, Claire’s mental activities 
as a focalizer must be naturalized within the frame experiencing. Yet these two 
exemplary cases highlight the fact that some serious overlapping may occur. 
Dowell is not merely telling his “saddest story” – the true sadness lurks in his 
sentimental recounting, in the fact that he experiences the tragedy of his life 
only retrospectively. Claire, on the contrary, does not recount her story – and yet 
her mental representations, when rendered in narrative discourse, create story-
worlds. Paradoxically, Claire becomes the focalizer of her own mental represen-
tations: if we consider the possible worlds created in Claire’s mind as separate 
from their narrative context, as such they are likely to evoke the frame of view-
ing as in example (13): “Now, he’s putting on his fur-lined jacket, knotting his 
scarf and leaving his flat. He gets into the lift. His wife stops him, she hands him 
his gloves. He thanks her and kisses her.” In Claire’s mind, the cognitive proc-
esses of telling, experiencing and viewing are symptomatically entwined, and 
that is likely to happen in the reader’s mind as well.5
In fact, one way to get hold of the story would be to read it as free indirect 
discourse all through since we never actually seem to exit Claire’s experiential 
field. Consequently, the notion of FID – or the representation of fictional con-
sciousness in general – as embedded discourse (see, eg, Ron 1981; Ryan 1991; 
Palmer 2004: 183–193) becomes problematic: how to construct the outer frame 
in the same vein, we could actually reduce all such modalizing expressions as sans 
doute, probablement and sûrement to one – clairement. Clarity is also le mot juste in 
describing the spare style of the novel’s narration and its insistency on material de-
tails. The wordplay would thus reinforce our interpretation of the narration as being 
completely filtered through and organized in Claire’s consciousness.
5 Manfred Jahn (2003) draws our attention to the dynamics between the ”internal” 
stories that exist only in the individual mind (dreams, fantasies etc.) and the “exter-
nal” stories that are intersubjective. According to Jahn, narratives are recycled over 
and over again in the processes of internalization and externalization as we recount 
and receive them. The problematic at hand is situated at the very threshold of inter-
nalization and externalization: whereas Dowell seeks to cope with his internal anxi-
eties by offering an external account to an imaginary audience, Claire constructs 
internal representations whose externalization rests on the narratorial voice. Yet the 
ambiguity between “internal” and “external” not only remains but is thematized 
in these stories as an ambiguity that characterizes all consciousness representation: 
aren’t we all telling stories mostly to ourselves?
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that would be free of the character’s subjectivity, in which this subjectivity would 
be neatly nested? Again, in examples (11–14) as in earlier ones from The Good 
Soldier, pure modal logic proves insufficient. As interpreters of the novel – as 
the ultimate cognitive processors – we are made to reach beyond referentiality 
and textual markers of discourse attribution and to consider the multiple nar-
rative and experiential levels of the story at the same time. Again, there is no 
recursive system of representation where the outer frame could falsify the inner 
frame. The transfer from actual to mental does not inevitably show in the tex-
tual surface, and therefore it is the transitional states in the creation of narrative 
domains – representational thresholds of sorts – that are of crucial importance 
for our reading. The example of Sa femme highlights one of the functions of FID 
as a transitional mode between the textual actual world and embedded mental 
and hypothetical domains.
To take another example of a “narrativizing focalizer,” we may have a look 
into the mind of the burn-out wife and mother Martha in Fay Weldon’s short 
story ‘Weekend.’ For Weldon’s protagonist, the construction of other minds, es-
pecially that of her husband Martin, is based on pathologic insecurity; we are 
told that Martin “seldom spoke a harsh word, but Martha, after the fashion of 
wives, could detect his mood from what he did not say rather than what he did” 
(‘Weekend:’ 310). Fludernik (1996: 188–191) offers the story as an example of 
“reflectorized narration,” yet not as a paradigmatic case with the protagonist 
as the fixed center of focalization and the source of idiomatic expressions. As 
Fludernik points out, Martha’s mind is constantly penetrated and patronized by 
the demanding voice of her husband as well as the more general, socio-cultural 
doxa defining the right kind of motherhood, wifehood and womanhood.
(15) Martha paid her [the cleaning woman] out of her own wages: well, the 
running of the house was Martha’s concern. If Martha chose to go out 
to work, as was her perfect right, Martin allowed, even though it wasn’t 
the best thing for the children, but that must be Martha’s moral respon-
sibility – Martha must surely pay her domestic stand-in. An evident 
truth, heard loud and clear and frequent in Martin’s mouth and Mar-
tha’s heart. (‘Weekend:’ 310)
(16) People, children, houses, conversations, food, drink, theatres – even, 
now, a career. Martin standing between her and the hostility of the 
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world – popular, easy, funny Martin, beckoning the rest of the world 
into earshot. Ah, she was grateful, the little earnest Martha, with her 
shy ways and her penchant for passing boring exams – how her life had 
blossomed out. (ibid.: 311)
Also in this case, the whole story could be interpreted as FID all the way (slid-
ing towards stream of consciousness and occasionally to first-person refer-
ence) – but not just as an intermediary discourse or mental domain between 
the extradiegetic narrator and the diegetic consciousness, but as a constant am-
biguity between mental domains within the fictional storyworld. However, in 
spite of the apparent multitude of voices at work in the story, we actually never 
leave Martha’s consciousness – a rather obvious interpretation, yet Fludernik 
remains reticent on this point. On the one hand, we find Martin’s discourag-
ing comments scattered, often in parentheses, among Martha’s flow of stressful 
thoughts: “Martin liked his potatoes carefully peeled. He couldn’t bear to find 
little cores of black in the mouthful. (‘Well, it isn’t very nice, is it?’: Martin)” 
(ibid.: 321). On the other hand, her mind is penetrated by the self-help type of 
pep talk and mottos, often rendered in the generic second person, that establish 
her script for creating a perfect bourgeois bliss: “Gaze into the eyes. Love. It 
must be love. You married him. You. Surely you deserve true love?” (ibid.: 313.) 
As Fludernik rightly states, “[b]y refusing definite attributions of the discourse, 
the text iconically represents the pervasiveness of societal pressures on Martha” 
(Fludernik 1996: 191). In other words, the levels of intentionality are again only 
implied since the narration avoids parentheticals. One of the functions of FID 
in this story is, obviously, to demonstrate how Martha adopts Martin’s views 
uncritically as part of her own rationalizing (“well, the running of the house was 
Martha’s concern”). Yet one might feel that this – Martha being victimized to 
other voices – is not the whole story, although the narration rather convincingly 
demonstrates the discursive power of the patriarchal establishment.
Relatively early in the story, we learn that “Martha’s mother had, towards the 
end, thought that people were plotting against her” (‘Weekend:’ 311). Towards 
the end of the story, it becomes more and more obvious that Martha’s destiny is 
to follow her mother’s footsteps (a matrilinear destiny already prefigured in the 
phonetic form of the protagonist’s name). In the narration, Martha’s paranoia 
is rendered through embedded consciousness representation; again, the absence 
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of parentheticals enhances the impression that Martha really believes her own 
hypotheses to be the truth.
(17) Dishes were boring, Katie implied by her manner, and domesticity was 
boring, and anyone who bothered with that kind of thing was a fool. 
Like Martha. (ibid.: 315)
(18) She is running around in her nightie. Now if that had been Katie – but 
there’s something so practical about Martha. Reassuring, mind; but the 
skimpy nightie and the broad rump and the thirty-eight years are all 
rather embarrassing. Martha can see it in Colin and Katie’s eyes. Mar-
tin’s too. Martha wishes she did not see so much in other people’s eyes. 
Her mother did, too. Dear, dear mother. Did I misjudge you? (ibid.: 
316)
The only way to really get inside Martha’s consciousness, behind the neurotical-
ly cheerful discourse of women’s magazines and self-help manuals, is through 
other minds. The only means for Martha to deal with her fears is to transform 
them into other people’s feelings of disappointment and scorn. Some of the FID 
passages render Martha’s projected subjectivity as a multiply framed perception 
or judgment, revealing the kind of mental states she would be unable to verbal-
ize directly, with herself as the subject.
(19) The children noticed nothing: it was just funny lively laughing Daddy 
being witty about Mummy’s car. Mummy, done for drunken driving. 
Mummy, with the roots of melancholy somewhere deep beneath the 
bustling, busy, everyday self. (ibid.: 311)
Here, Martha first constructs the experience of her children (of ignoring the 
sharp edge in Martin’s comments to Martha), but then continues to use their 
experiential and discursive frame – by referring to herself as “Mummy” – to ap-
proach her own “melancholy” – a state of affairs that definitely passes the rest of 
the family without a notice.
One of the narrative tricks of the story lies in the alteration between iterative 
and singulative recounting of the “typical weekend” of Martha and Martin’s 
family and furthermore, of Martin’s critical remarks. Something Martin has 
perhaps once casually uttered is amplified in Martha’s mind as she tries to pen-
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etrate her husband’s mind in order to better please him. Consequently, Martin’s 
utterances, rendered in direct discourse, cease to be direct in any respect other 
than linguistic; none of the speech and thought of other characters exist inde-
pendently of Martha’s consciousness, and therefore they must be interpreted as 
subordinate to her mental functioning. Iterative representation of a character’s 
consciousness (of one’s habitual thoughts, feelings, opinions) is usually seen as 
a pronouncedly narratorial function since it requires temporal distancing (cf. 
Fludernik 1996: 184); in ‘Weekend,’ Martha is able to use such narrative author-
ity due to her ambivalent temporal status: at times, she is the focalizer of one 
single event (a weekend at their cottage with their friends Colin and Katie) – and 
at times, the narration seems to depict her habitual experience of the exhaust-
ing family weekends. The story ends in Martha’s hysterical breakdown as her 
daughter starts her first period – definitely a singulative episode. The piling up 
of pressure and its discharging into tears is accompanied by the story’s temporal 
structure; this kind of temporality is not straightforwardly related to “natural” 
experientiality of “catching a moment” – rather, the multi-level structure ena-
bles the narrative to represent both the cause and the effect of Martha’s mental 
functioning at the same time.
There is no getting round the fact that Martin casts the shadows of his “dis-
guised marital tyranny” (Fludernik 1996: 190) and “patriarchal values inimical 
to female self-realization” (ibid.: 191) over his wife. But then again, if we – instead 
of catching the easy bait – should foreground the “second-order representation” 
at work in Martha’s consciousness, there would also seem to be a “second-order 
feminist interpretation” available. All in all, Martha’s construction of the fam-
ily weekend – as it seems, both the material and the mental side of it – relies on 
the discursive schemas surrounding the myth of modern happiness rather than 
real time experientiality. Consequently, the high and contradictory expectations 
Martha thinks people have of her are her expectations of expectations (embed-
ded expectations?). She uses the schematic language representation (cf. above 
the discussion on Fludernik’s theory) in creating predictable representations of 
herself and imagining them to issue from the minds of others (cf. example 19 
using the schema of the “aging woman”) – and, furthermore, turns Martin’s sin-
gular speech acts as universals through schematization and typification. Yet one 
cultural schema (one that has caused fervent reactions within feminist theory 
for decades) remains beyond the reach of Martha herself, one that is, however, 
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likely to be activated both among the members of Martha’s family and in the 
mind of the Weldon reader: that of the madwoman.
Both in Bernheim’s novel and in Weldon’s short story, the third-person ref-
erence to the protagonist serves not so much to construct a narratorial pres-
ence as to highlight distancing and projecting as the main cognitive strategies of 
the protagonists. In fact, when we read seemingly indirect reporting of Claire’s 
obsessive focalization (“Elle pensa à Monsieur Corey”) – or, moreover, look at 
the way Martha is referred to in the third person (“the little earnest Martha”; 
“Mummy, done for drunken driving”), we can actually imagine the protagonists 
themselves using these narrative techniques that usually indicate indirectness 
brought on by the mediating narrative agent. As Ron (1981: 35) notes in his 
discussion of FID, markers of indirect representation such as verbs referring to 
mental functioning (think, feel, remember) may just as well belong to the char-
acter’s own discourse and thus point to her self-awareness in regard to her own 
cognitive processes. In a sense, Claire is the “other woman” also in relation and 
in reference to herself since she foregrounds the experience of Thomas’s wife, 
whereas Martha is not even able to see herself as an independent individual and 
thus fails to construct herself as a full subject. Paradoxically, the minds of Claire 
and Martha come close both to the homodiegetic and to the heterodiegetic nar-
ratorial status: homodiegetic in their dominance (resulting in the lack of ex-
tradiegetic manoeuvring) and heterodiegetic in their ostensible omniscience in 
recounting other people’s views and experiences.
4 The diegetic consciousness, mind-doubles, and the art of embedding
It is an entrenched desire of the reading mind to project other minds onto the 
narrative; as Margolin puts it,
even if the story is behavioristic in its manner of portrayal and provides 
no information about the cognitive functioning of storyworld partici-
pants, readers need to formulate hypotheses about the minds of agents 
and ascribe to them mental functioning in order to make sense of their 
doings in terms of human actions and interactions. (…) Not only the 
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working of the individual mind in isolation, but also its working as in-
fluenced by its internal image of the working of other minds appear to be 
necessary to make human sense of a narrative. (Margolin 2003: 284)
Consequently, Claire’s twisted mental functioning may not be that twisted af-
ter all. To be honest, when we first read about Thomas having a family, didn’t 
our minds start ticking, trying to construct the non-existent wife and kids – by 
asking appropriate (rhetorical) questions such as “what would his wife think 
if she knew…?” Claire’s hypotheses stand in parallel to the reader’s process of 
fictional (mental) world construction also in a deeper ontological sense since 
the little information Thomas gives her in the first place is nothing but pure fic-
tion. Yet the interpretive question remains, with Claire and, more or less, with 
the other protagonists we have discussed, whether they are conscious fiction 
makers, know-alls who are after the “truth,” or merely delusive. In Sa Femme, 
there is one striking passage that compels us to ponder whether Claire is, in fact, 
consciously trying to fit her reality into the cultural schemas of adultery and the 
“other woman.”
(20) She wondered if Thomas talked about her: ‘I have a mistress.’ She nearly 
burst out laughing. She repeated the words ‘a mistress’ several times, 
beneath her breath. A couple seated opposite her looked at her, so she 
stopped. But for the rest of the journey she couldn’t help smiling. (Sa 
Femme, Or the Other Woman: 80–81)
 Elle se demanda soudain si Thomas parlait d’elle. ”J’ai une maîtresse.” 
Elle faillit éclater de rire. Elle répéta plusieurs fois ”maîtresse” à mi-
voix. Un couple assis en face d’elle la regardait, alors elle se tut. Mais 
pendant tout le reste du trajet, elle ne put s’empêcher de sourire. (Sa 
femme: 82)
Thomas’s hypothetical speech act echoes Emma Bovary’s famous silent exclama-
tion “J’ai un amant!”; characteristically, Emma’s illusion of the sublime is turned 
into Claire’s twisted habit of experiencing feelings by projecting them into other 
people’s emotions, in this case into Thomas’s thrill of having a maîtresse. Does 
Claire experience herself as a truly Emma-like heroine in the middle of an excit-
ing drama? Or is she victimized by those frames like Flaubert’s Emma? Or is it 
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just the reader who draws the parallels? Ultimately, it depends on our interpre-
tation how many passages we may find from represented worlds to others.
Ford’s Dowell and Bernheim’s Claire share the tendency to over-organize 
their experience, and in all their self-sufficiency, their mental representations, 
as such, come very close to resembling narrative fiction. However, just as some 
fictions are more skillful and innovative than others, Dowell’s constructions 
show much more artistic ambition than Claire’s idyllic visions of her lover’s do-
mestic happiness. When exploring this type of narrativizing characters, we can 
imagine a scale ranging from highly sophisticated narrators or focalizers who 
are masters of fabulation just as their flesh-and-blood authors (Nabokov’s Hum-
bert, Mann’s Aschenbach, Ford’s Dowell) to the more brutally twisted minds of 
Claire and Martha. Artistic or less so, these characters are there to play the “Mi-
metic Language Game” on us. Fludernik defines realism in terms of narratology 
as “a mimetic representation of individual experience that cognitively and epis-
temically relies on real-world knowledge” (Fludernik 1996: 38); instead of being 
mimetic in this way, these minds are diegetic in their eagerness to press their 
own version of the fictional world upon the reader. This is not, by any means, 
striking when we consider characters who are narrators of their own story; it is 
when focalizing characters in heterodiegetic narrative situations “use” narrative 
techniques for the benefit of their own perspective that we may especially need 
to readjust our reading strategies – as well as our narratological categories, for 
that matter. Furthermore, through verbalization and narrative organization, the 
narrator, and again, more remarkably, the focalizer can be regarded as narrat-
ing their own minds. As Margolin (2003: 281) notes, “[i]t is only in the narrated 
domain that the full range of human cognitive activities can be portrayed or 
represented.”
Thematically, constructing other people’s thoughts and emotions and nar-
rativizing them may, in many cases, be linked to emotional defense and self-
deception on the part of the protagonist. In all the exemplary stories discussed 
above, none of the protagonists seem exactly to be “there:” Dowell settling for 
a role of a mere bystander in a story where he actually is the bitterly deceived 
one; Ford’s Peeping Tom recounting what he did not think or feel; Claire con-
structing herself as the maîtresse; and Martha reflecting her own image as the 
“little earnest Martha” or practical but asexual housekeeper in other people’s 
eyes. As Margolin (2003: 287) points out, fiction often provides us with repre-
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sentations of non-standard mental functioning (see also Semino 2002); Claire is, 
undoubtedly, a case in point, but part of the strangeness of her perceptions and 
hypotheses originates in the very “unnaturalness” of consciousness representa-
tion as such, of rendering mentally constructed worlds in language. This feeling 
of strangeness, one might think, is an argument against the cognitive-narratolo-
gist tendency to consider all construction as narration: narrativizing one’s own 
experiences, and especially those of other people, may also indicate non-stand-
ard, deviant mental functioning. What I am trying to suggest here, against the 
cognitive grain, is that it is the overly narrativizing, obsessive, artistic, paranoid 
mind that stands in parallel to the techniques of modernist narration, not the 
“ordinary” human mind relying on the parameters of everyday experience. By 
verbalizing all kinds of mental activity, by forcing the complex and multiple 
cognitive representations through the single semiotic channel of language, liter-
ary fiction distorts the human mind and often makes it difficult to tell the sane 
from the insane.
In the present discussion, free indirect discourse has been understood, above 
all, as a discursive path from mental domains to others. Furthermore, it is pe-
culiarly this mode that seems to create confusion and overlapping between the 
cognitive frames of telling and experiencing as Fludernik defines them. Accord-
ing to Margolin, focalization can also be understood in terms of actual cognitive 
processes, that is, as “deictic anchoring, intentionality, attention and perception, 
cognitive processing and resultant mental representation of a domain” (Margo-
lin 2003: 283). The examples discussed above – and we may find any number 
of others – demonstrate, however, that diegesis always doubles the deixis, the 
attention, the resultant presentation – and, most importantly, the intention in 
representing the fictional storyworld. The task of postclassical (cognitive or oth-
erwise) narratology could and should be to reach beyond the classical dual voice 
hypothesis and explore the full potential of the double entendre evoked by the 
implicitness of the levels of intentionality: we should not only speak of dou-
ble-voiced discourse, but, in many cases, about double deixis or perhaps – dual 
cognition. Free indirect discourse – in all its ambiguity and heterogeneity – is at 
the core of this issue, displaying the inherently unnatural relationship between 
story and discourse (cf. Ginsburg 1982: 140, 145), of the diegetic leap between 
actual experience and its mediating through other minds, fictional and real.
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There is no true mimesis of the mind; some fictions, such as The Good Sol-
dier and Sa femme, thematize the essence of the other mind as a fictional con-
struction. Consequently, modes of thought representation such as FID should 
not be seen as merely serving the cognitive vraisemblance since they bear in 
themselves also the potential to undermine such mimetic effects. The fictional 
mind is, if anything, a reading mind. A pronouncedly literary mode of narration 
such as FID is likely to focus our attention to the nature of experientiality in fic-
tion as projection – as the doubling of the mind through language.
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